I have been talking about the Cubs’ poor baserunning for 2-3 years, and last August posted a number of comments regarding this.  I will not duplicate that post, and will focus on one point I made a year ago:  “Making an out at third is, in my opinion, one of the most foolish plays in sports.  You are already in scoring position, and the risk/reward doesn’t make sense.  If I was a manager, I would tell my players unless it’s 100% you’ll be safe at third, you don’t go.  I’ve seen Cub players thrown out at third on balls that got away from the catcher.  Outs at third base ruin innings.”  Other than a force out, there is no excuse to make an out at third in my opinion.

I have spoken about how their reckless baserunning has cost them, and will provide some examples here.  In addition, poor sliding technique has also cost them, and neither of these issues seems to be addressed.  Many of the games this past week featured terrible baserunning, first outs at third base, runners being safe but coming off the bag, etc.  I will provide details.  The question is if and when Joe Maddon will address this.  I’ve been saying this for years, and if the last week doesn’t bring changes, then it’s fair to question the strategy.

Unless the throw beats a runner to the base and the runner has to avoid a tag, the runner needs to slide directly into the base and time the slide so he hits the base as quickly as possible and doesn’t overslide the base, but stops once he makes contact.  Today’s baserunners slide too late, and their momentum takes them over the bag or past it, and they lose contact temporarily.  Runners have to be drilled to slide into the bag, with their leg outstretched and on the ground so it hits the base as quickly as possible and stays there.  I am against headfirst slides due to injury concerns (Kris Bryant’s year has been significantly affected by an injury from a headfirst slide), but if a runner does that, the same has to hold true for his hand.  He must time the slide so his hand hits the base as quickly as possible and stays there.  Time and again Cub runners overslide bases and lose contact, and Maddon doesn’t address this.

On July 31 against the Pirates, Addison Russell doubled in a run in the top of the 9th inning to cut the Pirate lead to 5-4, and was then out at third for the first out of the inning trying to stretch the double into a triple.  He was actually initially safe, but did not time his slide properly and lost contact with the bag and was tagged out.  Rather than having the tying run on third with no outs in the 9th, they had no one on and one out and lost.  Let’s look at Russell’s mistakes on this play.  One was trying for third when the play was going to be close.  Two was making the first out at third.  Three was not timing his slide properly.  These are all common mistakes Cub players continually make.  Four, in my opinion, was sliding headfirst.

In a recent game prior to this, Ian Happ tried to steal third and would have been easily out, but the Cubs got lucky the throw was terrible.  Earlier in the year, Contreras was out at third on a key play after initially being safe, but he was unable to maintain contact with the base.

The next day, August 1, the Cubs are up 2-0 against the Pirates in the first inning, and have first and second, one out.  Baez is on second.  He gets picked off while trying to steal third, but the pitcher threw the ball away and Baez scored and the Cubs went on to score another run, for a 4-0 first-inning lead.  Trying to steal third was idiotic and he should have been easily out, but the Cubs got lucky that the pitcher threw it away.  Instead of ruining an inning by being out and costing the Cubs the additional 2 runs, they got lucky.  This doesn’t change the fact that it was not smart for Baez to try to steal third and risk a big inning, which is what the inning was looking like.  Since this worked, there doesn’t seem to be an effort to get the players to stop doing this.  In the same game, in the 9th inning, Zobrist led off with a single, and then was out at third on an infield single by Heyward, again making the first out of an inning at third when an out should never be made at third except for a force.  The mistakes just continue and don’t get addressed.

On August 3, up 1-0 in the second inning against the Padres, Schwarber singles with one out.  The batter hits a high hopper to the pitcher, who throws out the batter at first for the second out.  Schwarber, instead of staying in scoring position at second base, gets caught between second and third and is tagged out, ruining another inning.  These plays can cost games, but the Cubs continue to make them.  Later in the game, with the Cubs up 4-2 in the bottom of the 8th, Baez leads off with a triple.  There were no outs, and he was just safe at third.  In addition to it not being smart to take this risk, he didn’t time his slide correctly and after his lead hand hit the base, he lost contact with the base for a while until he could touch it with his other hand.  If the fielder could have maintained the tag, he would have been out.  Again, these are fundamentals.  When to go and when not to go.  How to slide properly and maintain contact.  Mistakes continue to happen, and they are the same mistakes.

On August 5, against the Padres, in the bottom of the 5th inning down 5-2, Baez doubled in a run to make it 5-3, then tried to steal third with Bote at bat (an over .300 hitter) and was out.  Though it is not smart to try to steal third, once again Baez beat the throw but didn’t time his slide properly, couldn’t maintain contact, and was tagged out.  This was a very costly mistake, both in trying to steal third and not sliding properly.  In the bottom of the 6th, down 5-3, Bote gets picked off second when the Cubs had runners on first and second, two outs.  The Cubs went on to lose the game.

The Cubs have a culture of selfishness and recklessness on the bases.  The players want to show they are aggressive, can make acrobatic slides, and are hustling, and as a result, do things that hurt the team.  (These are the same reasons I believe players headfirst slide into first, though it slows them down.)  This needs to be addressed by the manager, as it will cost them in the playoffs or even with playoff position.  Time after time the same mistakes are being made and nothing seems to be done to address it.  Needless risks trying to get to third base, and not sliding properly resulting in oversliding bases, sliding and popping up during a tag when you should stay down, and losing contact with the base.  This doesn’t include the risk of injury from all the headfirst slides they do.  The issue with this should be obvious to everyone at last after the past week, but we will see if it is addressed.

Joe Maddon cost the Cubs a meaningful game for first place yesterday by making the same mistake he regularly makes, which is letting the other team’s best hitter beat you.  There was no score in the second inning, and the Cardinals had men on first and second, two out.  Tommy Pham, their best hitter and one of the best hitters in baseball, was up, and the on-deck batter was hitting .167.  Instead of walking Pham, which I realize would have loaded the bases, Maddon chose to pitch to him.  Even when the count went to 2-0, making it a hitter’s pitch, the Cubs chose to pitch to him, and he hit a 3-run homer.  The Cubs lost 3-2.  Carpenter, the .167 hitter, was 0-3 for the game, lowering his average to .161.  Previous posts will show other examples of Maddon letting the other team’s best hitter beat them, instead of taking their chances with a hitter not hitting as well.

Joe Maddon recently helped cost the Cubs a game by not attempting to squeeze in a squeeze situation, and did the same thing in today’s game.  The Cubs and Brewers were tied 1-1 in the top of the 8th inning, and the Cubs had a man on third with one out.  The Cubs had one run the entire game (on a homerun) and only 5 hits.  Their odds of scoring were better with an attempted squeeze, since they weren’t hitting or scoring.  The Cubs didn’t squeeze and didn’t score.  When a team doesn’t score and strands a runner on third with less than 2 outs, the momentum change increases the chance of the other team scoring their next at-bat, and the Brewers did score to take a 2-1 lead into the 9th inning.  The Cubs did rally in the 9th to win, thanks to help from the Brewers’ bad fielding, but Maddon’s failure to squeeze could have cost the Cubs the game.

The Cubs and Marlins were tied 1-1 in the top of the 15th inning.  The Cubs had only 7 hits to that point, had only scored 1 run, and had not scored in 12 innings.  They had bases loaded, one out, and despite the fact that the Cubs weren’t scoring and not coming through in the clutch all game (they finished the game 0-11 with runners in scoring position), rather than attempting to squeeze to score the go-ahead run, Maddon let Heyward swing and he hit into a double play.  The Cubs lost 2-1 in 17 innings, ending the Cubs’ chances for an undefeated season.

Joe Maddon continues to cost the Cubs games and almost cost them others by not having smart rules in place, by allowing the same mistakes to be made over and over, and by not clearly explaining to his players what is smart and what isn’t smart.  The game two days ago was the fourth straight game that terrible baserunning either contributed to a loss or almost resulted in a loss, and this has been a problem for far longer.  I will review the mistakes Maddon allows the Cubs to continually make.

Strategy:  Letting the opponent’s hottest or best hitter beat you in situations with a runner or runners in scoring position with two outs and first base open.  McCutcheon and Goldschmidt have hurt the Cubs in this situation over and over, and Votto has also hurt the Cubs.  In Thursday’s game, Votto was up with runners on second and third, two out, second inning, and the Reds up 4-0.  Votto not only hurts the Cubs, but at the time was one of the hottest hitters in MLB history.  Maddon pitches to him, he hits a 3-run homerun, and it’s now 7-0.  The Cubs got down 9-0 and tied it before losing, so this decision contributed to the loss.  This happens over and over and Maddon continues to pitch to these guys in that situation.

Baserunning 1:  Batters get a hit to drive in a run and are then out trying for second (or the runner on first is out trying for third) because the runners assume the throw will not be cut off.  When it is cut off and they are out on the bases, this ruins the inning, which is an inning where you have momentum and just scored.  In Tuesday’s game, Almora was thrown out at second on a hit when it could have been first and third, no outs, late in a 0-0 game.  They didn’t score that inning as a result, and lost 2-1.  Almora assumed they would throw to third, so tried to take second, and it was costly.  On Friday, Almora hit an RBI single and was caught between first and second, resulting in Baez trying to score from third and being thrown out at home.  These mistakes continue to happen and are tolerated.

Baserunning 2:  Being smart on the bases.  On Wednesday, Lackey wandered far off second and was picked off.

Baserunning 3:  Sliding into first base, other than to avoid a tag, slows you down and can be the difference in being safe or out.  Players want to showboat and show everyone how much they hustle, so they do this and it costs their team.  On Thursday, Zobrist slid headfirst into first base and was out, when he would have been safe if he had run through the bag.  Had he been safe, it would have been first and third, no outs, down 9-8.  The Cubs lost the game, so this was an important play.  To show that Maddon never addresses this, Baez slid headfirst into first later in the same game, again being called out.

Baserunning 4:  Headfirst slides are dangerous and Maddon should not allow them unless a runner is diving back to a base.  On the Baez headfirst slide on Thursday, he was shaken up on the play.

Baserunning 5:  Making an out at third is, in my opinion, one of the most foolish plays in sports.  You are already in scoring position, and the risk/reward doesn’t make sense.  If I was a manager, I would tell my players unless it’s 100% you’ll be safe at third, you don’t go.  I’ve seen Cub players thrown out at third on balls that got away from the catcher.  Outs at third base ruin innings.  In Friday’s game, in the bottom of the 7th with the Cubs up 5-1, Zobrist tries to steal third and is out.  This ruins the inning and changes the momentum.  The Blue Jays scored 3 runs the next inning to make it 5-4, and it could have cost the Cubs the game.

Batting:  There are situations where a batter has to make contact, such as in today’s game, where the tying run was on third with one out in the tenth inning.  Batters are not adjusting and shortening swings, especially with 2 strikes, and continue to take wild swings trying to hit a homerun, resulting in key strikeouts.  Sports is all about adjusting, and batters don’t adjust with two strikes.  They should shorten their swing, choke up, and make contact.

A manager’s job is to put his team in the best position to win, and allowing these mistakes to occur over and over is doing the opposite.

Once again, for the third day in a row, the Twins made the same mistakes against the White Sox that did and could have cost them games.  Today, in the bottom of the third with the Twins up 3-1 and a man on first with 2 outs, Polanco doubles in the run to make it 4-1 but is out attempting to go to third, ending the inning instead of still having a runner in scoring position.  The Sox made the score 4-3, and though the Twins won 6-4, this play had the potential of costing them the game.

Paul Molitor, manager of the Twins, makes the same mistakes all other managers make and that have been pointed out both recently and for a long time on Sportstruths.  In last night’s game against the White Sox, three mistakes were made, which probably cost them the game.  Molitor allowed a runner to slide into first base (it appears he doesn’t have a policy prohibiting this unless it’s to avoid a tag) and twice pitched to the White Sox’ best and hottest hitter when he didn’t have to, and got burned both times.

After the Twins player slid into first base turning a probable hit into an out, announcer Steve Stone said word for word what I have always said about this.  This quote is almost exactly what he said.  “For all you young players out there, the only time you slide into first is to avoid a tag.  It slows you down.  Do you see sprinters sliding to the finish line?  No, they run through the tape because you get there faster.  And, headfirst sliding puts you at risk of injury to your hand, wrist, and shoulder.”  Obvious things that have been said for a long time, but managers still allow this and it still costs teams games.

In the top of the 5th, in a 1-1 game, the Sox had first and third, two outs, and Melky Cabrera up.  Cabrera is the Sox’ best and hottest hitter.  I’m sure Molitor didn’t want to walk him and put an additional runner in scoring position, but that would have been the smart play since Cabrera is hot and had been robbed of a double earlier in the game.  He pitched to Cabrera, he doubled in both runs, and the Sox led 3-1.

In the top of the 9th, Twins leading 5-4, the Sox had a man on second with two outs, and Cabrera up.  Do they walk Cabrera?  No, and he singles in the tying run and the Sox go on to win 6-5 in 10 innings.

I’ve also written recently about the bad strategy of making outs at third and managers having policies against this.  In the previous night’s game, the score was 1-1 in the bottom of the 8th, and a Twin runner on second was out trying to advance to third on a flyout.  This was their second bad baserunning play of the game, and could have cost them the game had they lost.

On July 25, the Cubs played the White Sox.  Down 4-2, Baez leads off the 9th with a double, and with no outs, steals third. If he’s out, the game is probably over. Then, with a man on first and no outs, down 4-3, Bryant singles the runner to third, so it should be first and third, no outs, with great momentum. But, Bryant tries to stretch it into a double with no outs, and is out at second, ruining a potential big inning. And, Bryant goes in headfirst and is shaken up. He’s already been hurt doing that. The Cubs tie it and have two on, but don’t score and eventually lose the game 5-4. The Bryant play hurt them and could have cost them the game, and it’s not the first time he’s done that. Whether it’s him and Baez, or the coaches, I keep saying this is absolutely inexcusable. They ran themselves out of innings last year and also this year, and Maddon doesn’t get it. He will probably say he’s glad the players are aggressive. It’s not aggressive, it’s foolish. I blame Maddon for not setting these rules and continually losing games as a result.

I’ve pointed out before that the only reason I can think of to make an out at third or home is if there is a runner on third, one out, the batter hits a fly ball that will be the second out, and it would take a good throw to the plate to get the runner.  Other than that, the risk/reward differential is huge, the runner is already in scoring position, and I believe runners should not attempt to go to third or score unless the chance of being safe is 100%.  Regarding the headfirst slide, I’ve also said that managers should not allow their players to do that due to the risk of injury.

Joe Maddon played a big role in two recent Cub losses, in fairly meaningful games, by making the same mistakes over and over again and never learning from this.  If you scroll down and read the posts below, you will see prior evidence of exactly what I am talking about regarding these two games.  Here are the two recent examples of what I am referring to.

The Cubs played the Mets tonight.  The game is fairly meaningful, because after going 7-0 against the Mets last year, the Cubs were swept in the playoffs and lost the first 4 games to the Mets this year, meaning 8 straight losses.  The Cubs won last night, and a win tonight would have made a statement.  The game was tied 1-1, and Strop pitched the top of the 8th inning for the Cubs.  They showed Rondon warming up in the bullpen, and I immediately made the statement that Maddon, instead of bringing back Strop for the 9th if the game was still tied, would bring in Rondon, and he’d give up a run and the Cubs would lose 2-1.  If you read the posts below, you will see that when Maddon brings Rondon in the game in these non-save situations, he gives up a run.  His mentality is to pitch with the save on the line.  How many times will Maddon do this until he realizes it fails?  Of course, Rondon gave up a run and the Cubs lost 2-1.

On July 9, the Cubs played the Pirates.  The Cubs had been losing a lot the last few weeks, and the Pirates are one of the teams in their division that is trying to catch them.  In the bottom of the 4th inning, the score was 5-5, and the Pirates had runners on second and third with 2 outs.  McCutchen was up, followed by a .250 hitter.  As I’ve pointed out in the posts below, not only does McCutchen hurt the Cubs and has for years, but he has come through in these situations in the past.  I immediately said you have to walk him.  Maddon pitches to him, he singles in two runs, and the 7-5 Pirate lead resulted in a Pirate victory.  How many times will Maddon pitch to McCutchen in these situations and get burned before he understands you don’t let the other team’s best or hottest hitter beat you, or the hitter that has a history of doing so?

The post below talked about how damaging to a team’s chances making outs at third base is, and why the risk is so high compared to the reward.  It also talked about batters making an out on the bases on the same play that they drove in a run.  Just 4 days later, another perfect example of both of these situations probably cost another team a game.  Doing this has cost teams games for decades, but managers and players never learn.

In today’s White Sox-Twins game, the White Sox led 5-2.  The Twins made it 5-4 and would have had men on first and second with one out and momentum having just scored, but a Twins player tried to take third on the hit and was thrown out at third, ruining the inning (the Twins didn’t score again in the inning).  He also slowed down going into third, resulting in being out by even more.  When the Twins batter got a hit in a later inning to make it 5-5, again having momentum and a man on base, he took too wide a turn off first base and was thrown out on the play, again ruining the inning.  Both of these situations were addressed in the post below, and both of them occurred in this game to help the Sox win 6-5.

Of course, the Sox’ winning run was a gift, as was a previous run that scored on a bases-loaded hit-by-pitch.  For the winning run, there were 2 outs, nobody on, in the bottom of the 8th, and the Twins pitcher walked the next two batters, putting the eventual winning run in scoring position, and he did score on a hit.  I had no issue with Garcia walking (the first walk), but the pitcher then walked Coats, who was hitting .059.  In addition, after the Sox scored their sixth run, with runners on second and third and 2 outs, the Twins’ catcher and first baseman let a foul popup drop.

I’ve said for a long time that making outs at third base is one of the most stupid plays in sports.  The risk/reward of trying for third is very unfavorable.  I’ve said that if I was a manager, I’d give my team these rules, and let them know that they would be benched for not complying.

1. Sliding to first base after hitting the ball unless it’s to avoid a tag.
2. Attempting to steal third base (unless you’re Rickey Henderson).
3. Trying to take third base when the ball gets away from the catcher, unless you can basically go in standing up.

The Cubs lost a game about a week and a half ago in part by doing this.  Zobrist homered to lead off the game, and then Heyward doubled.  One out later, Heyward was thrown out at third on a steal attempt.  Strasburg was pitching for the Nationals, and only gave up one run in 6 innings.  Running out of this inning likely cost them the game or contributed to the loss, as the Cubs lost in 12 innings.

4 games later, the Cubs, having just swept the Pirates 3 games, were losing to the Cardinals 3-2 in the bottom of the 9th inning, and had runners on first and second with one out.  The ball got away from the catcher, Almora tried to advance from second to third, and was thrown out.  The next batter (Zobrist) singled (although no one knows what he would have done had Almora still been on second), but that only made it first and third, and the Cubs lost.  Zobrist was 2-4 prior to that at-bat and hitting over .310, so it made no sense to try to take third unless it wouldn’t have been close.  Again, attempting to take third might have cost them the game.

This game started the Cubs on a losing streak that today reached 6 of 7, so games like this can have an impact.  In addition, the Cardinals came into the Cub series having been swept and well behind the Cubs in the standings, so a 9th-inning rally in the first game could have been demoralizing to the Cardinals.  Washington was the team behind the Cubs in league record, and the Cardinals are behind the Cubs in the division, so these losses were to key rivals.

I saw two other games in this time span where attempted steals of third failed and cost the teams, ruining promising innings.  I have no idea why managers think trying to steal third is a good play.  In my opinion, unless it won’t be close, don’t try to take third.

Another thing I don’t understand is when a batter gets a hit to drive in a run and then is thrown out at second because he thinks the throw is going home.  You’ve just scored a run (or more), you just got a hit, you have momentum and the pitcher is struggling, and you’re going to run into an out to help the opponent?

Joe Maddon continues to lose games by bringing in his closer in non-save situations (see post below), and he did it again.  The Cubs were playing the Pirates, who are in second place behind them in the standings, and each game has a two-game swing.  The Cubs trailed 1-0 going into the 9th at home, and Maddon brought in Rondon, his closer.  He did get an out, but gave up a homerun, single, and walk, and though a reliever got out of the inning, the homerun made it 2-0.  The Cubs scored a run in the bottom of the 9th, and lost 2-1.

Down 3-0 to the Braves, the Cubs scored 2 in the 8th and 1 in the 9th to tie the game.  What does Maddon do?  He brings in Rondon, his closer, for the 10th in a 3-3 game.  The Cubs continue to lose games by bringing in their closer in non-save situations, but Maddon did it again.  As soon as he brought him in, I said the game was lost.  The Braves, who had 3 hits in the previous 9 innings, got 2 hits and scored the winning run in the top of the 10th.

Joe Maddon, Cub manager, continues to make the same mistakes, and they continue to cost him games.  If you scroll down to the May 30, 2015 post, you will see how last year Maddon pitched to the opponent’s best hitter in key situations when he could have walked the batter rather than letting the opponent’s best hitter beat them, and it cost them the games.  In that post you will see that twice in one series, Maddon pitched to Arizona’s Paul Goldschmidt when he should have walked him, and it cost him both games.

What does Maddon do tonight?  With the Cubs leading 2-1 in the bottom of the 8th, Goldschmidt, having driven in Arizona’s only run, is batting with two outs, man on third.  There is no question you have to walk him in that situation, even though it means putting the lead run on base.   You can’t let the other team’s best hitter beat you.  Maddon pitches to Goldschmidt, he singles in the tying run, and the Diamondbacks score in the bottom of the 9th to win, costing the Cubs a chance for a perfect season (having started 3-0).

The Cubs continue to cost themselves outs on the bases by poor baserunning, which ruins innings and takes them out of scoring chances.  They attempt to steal third, take second when they shouldn’t, try to advance when they shouldn’t, etc.

Cub manager Joe Maddon, who I think is an excellent manager, has cost the Cubs some games and I’m not sure he’s learning from this.

On May 15, the Cubs led the Pirates 10-6 in the top of the 8th.  Andrew McCutchen was up, with 2 outs and runners on second and third.  Despite the fact that he hasn’t been hitting this year, he is their best hitter and hurts the Cubs.  I said they should walk him, even though that meant bringing the tying run to the plate.  I don’t want the other team’s best player to beat me, and I’ll take my chances with someone else.  Maddon pitched to him, he hit a 3-run homer to make it 10-9, the Pirates tied it in the 9th, and the Cubs won in extra innings.

On May 22, the Cubs led the Diamondbacks 4-2 in the bottom of the 10th.  Arizona had a man on second, with 2 outs, I believe.  Paul Goldschmidt is a very good hitter and hurts the Cubs, and had an RBI earlier in the game.  Does Maddon walk him, which I understand puts the tying run on base and the winning run at bat, and not let their best hitter beat them?  No, he pitches to Goldschmidt, and his 2-run homerun ties the game, and the Diamondbacks went on to win 5-4 in 13 innings.

On May 24, the Cubs played the Diamondbacks (2 days later).  In the bottom of the 3rd, Arizona had a man on second, two outs, winning 2-1.  Paul Goldschmidt is a very good hitter and hurts the Cubs, and had one of the two RBI earlier.  Sound familiar?  Did Maddon walk him?  No, and his 2-run homer made it 4-1 in an eventual 4-3 victory.

Tonight’s Sox-Tiger game was typical of Sox victories–complete gifts by the opposing team.  Let’s look at what happened tonight.

1.  I’ve said for a while that Chris Sale gets outside pitches to righties called strikes, although they are outside the strike zone.  Tonight, the two Sox radio announcers talked about how he was getting outside pitches that weren’t strikes called strikes, and said he should keep pitching there since the umpire was calling these balls strikes.  Shortly after hearing that, I turned the game on TV, and saw Cabrera batting with two on and a 2-1 count.  The next pitch was almost a half-foot outside, but it was called a strike to make the count 2-2 instead of 3-1.  Cabrera gave the umpire a shocked look.

2. In the top of the 5th, leading 4-3, the Tigers had first and third, no outs.  The batter hit a ground ball where the Sox decided to go for the double play, and the runner on third held and did not score.  That would have been a big run.

3. Up 6-3 in the bottom of the 8th, the Tigers got the first two outs.  Their pitcher then gave up 6 straight hits, and 4 runs, to turn a 6-3 lead into a 7-6 deficit.  It was obvious the pitcher had lost it and should have been removed before the Sox took the lead, but they left him in and it cost them the game.

4. In the top of the 9th, down 7-6 with one out, the Tiger batter singled to give the Tigers first and third with one out.  The batter rounded first too far, and was thrown out trying to get back to the base, turning a first-and-third one-out tying-run-on-third situation to a man on third with two outs, and they didn’t score.

Last year the Cubs would bring their closer, Kevin Gregg, into tie games in the 9th inning, and he would lose the game.  It happened a number of times, and the manager never realized he could not pitch in non-save situations.  The same thing is happening this year with Rondon, the Cubs’ closer.  Yet, their manager still doesn’t get this.  When he brought Rondon into the game tonight in the bottom of the 9th in a 5-5 game, I immediately said “game over.”  Rondon never got an out, and the Cubs lost.

The manager of the Seattle Mariners made the same mistakes major-league managers continue to make, as they don’t have a feeling for that particular game.

Felix Hernandez, a great pitcher, was pitching for Seattle.  Jose Quintana pitched for the Sox.  Both were pitching great games, and hits and runs were very hard to come by.  Seattle was batting in the top of the 8th inning, and the score was 0-0.  To that point in the game, they had 4 hits and the White Sox 1.  The lone Sox hit was by their first batter of the game.  Getting a run was critical, because the Sox weren’t hitting or scoring, and they weren’t either.  The Mariners had first and third, one out, with a lefty batter facing Quintana, who is a lefty.  The Mariners have a heavy-lefty lineup, and for some reason, didn’t replace most of the lefties with righties the day before, when Chris Sale pitched a complete game and only gave up one run, which was in the 9th when the game was over because the Sox had a big lead, and in today’s game, when again, the lefties couldn’t hit the lefty.  Lefties were 4 for 45 this year against Sale, so it made no sense to have that lineup.  I wonder if Seattle wondered why they had scored one meaningless run in two games.  Anyway, back to this game.  The Mariners had first and third, one out, and a lefty batter facing a lefty pitcher.  They hadn’t been hitting or scoring all series.  Does the Seattle manager squeeze?  Of course not, and the Mariners don’t score.  As so often happens, the change of momentum from holding a team after they have a man on third with less than two outs results in that team scoring the next inning.  The Sox did score 2 runs, and took a 2-0 lead into the 9th.  Seattle scored 2 in the 9th to tie.

In the bottom of the 9th, Seattle made a throwing error on a routine ground ball to allow the leadoff man and potential winning run to reach, then one out later wild-pitched the potential winning run into scoring position.  They did hold the Sox, and the game went into extra innings.

In the 10th inning, Seattle had second and third, one out.  Again, they hadn’t been scoring all series.  Does the manager squeeze?  Of course not, and they don’t score.

As I pointed out, runs were very hard to come by, so the game went 14 innings before Seattle finally won 3-2.  This is another case of a manager not understanding the situation in that particular game.

The Yankees played a big role in helping the White Sox win the first two games of a 4-game series.

In the first game, the Sox led 2-0 in the bottom of the 8th, and had a leadoff double.  That’s a huge potential run, as a 3-run lead makes a big difference.  The Yankees got the next two batters out, bringing up Dunn.  I believe the pitcher was a righty.  Dunn is a lefty, and the next batter was a righty.  The count went to 3-0 on Dunn, and I had no problem walking him.  The pitcher then threw a very hittable strike.  This concerned me, but I thought perhaps they would gamble he wouldn’t swing on 3-0, and then throw a breaking ball out of the zone on the 3-1 pitch, hoping he’d go after it.  Instead, the pitcher throws a fastball down the middle, and Dunn rips it for an RBI single, making it 3-0.  I immediately said that run would come back to haunt them.  The Yankees scored 2 in the top of the 9th to make it 3-2, which is how the game ended.

The next night, the Yankees took a 5-4 lead into the bottom of the 9th.  The Sox had a man on first, no outs, and Dunn up.  He’d just beaten them the night before on a fastball down the middle.  The count on Dunn goes to 0-2.  Does the pitcher throw a breaking ball out of the zone trying to get him to swing?  Of course not.  He throws an 0-2 fastball right down the middle, Dunn homers, and the game is over.

Jose Abreu, White Sox 27-year-old rookie, leads the majors with 12 homeruns.  I have been saying for weeks that he is a tremendous hitter when thrown fastballs and changeups, but struggles greatly with offspeed pitches that break down and away.  Time and again I see him strike out on sliders and curves, and hit fastballs.  In last night’s game against Cleveland, Abreu was up with men on second and third, 2 outs, in the 8th inning, with the Indians leading 2-0.  A single ties the game, and a homerun gives the Sox the lead.  I was concerned when they decided not to walk him that they didn’t understand they needed to throw him sliders away, but fortunately the pitcher threw three sliders away, and he swung and missed at all three.  None were near the plate, and the third one bounced in.  That smart strategy allowed the Indians to beat the Sox.

So, to today’s game.  Kluber, the Indians’ starter, threw Abreu a fastball in the first inning, and he hit a homerun.  That decision cost them the game.  Abreu struck out his three other at-bats on sliders and curves.  During one of his last two at-bats, Sox TV announcer Steve Stone said after the fastball homerun, he is seeing a steady diet of sliders.  Ken Harrelson, the other Sox TV announcer, said that would continue to happen until he showed he could lay off those pitches or go the opposite way, to right field.  It’s about time other teams started noticing this, as it’s been obvious for weeks.

Now, to another point.  I’ve said for years that when a manager takes out a pitcher who’s been completely dominant, the other team gets hope and many times starts hitting and scoring.  There is no excuse for this if the pitcher’s pitch count isn’t high or there aren’t injury concerns.  However, there are times when the pitch count is high.  I know this sounds like a risky proposal, but if I was the manager and the pitcher had a high pitch count, but had been completely dominant, I would tell him to go out for the ninth and not throw quite as hard.  If he gave up a hit (unless possibly it was with two outs), I would then make the change.  The team that’s been dominated knows that pitcher has frustrated them all game.  I’ve seen taking the dominant pitcher out before the 9th inning starts backfire too many times.

So, what happened today?  Kluber was completely dominant.  He pitched 8 innings and only gave up one run–the first-inning homerun to Abreu.   He gave up 3 hits, and struck out 13, including 7 in a row.  His eighth inning was very easy–two groundouts and a strikeout.  He also only faced three batters in the 7th.  He’d thrown 110 pitches, so the manager brings in the closer, Axford, for the ninth, and this gives the Sox new life.  Cleveland went into the 9th leading 3-1.  Axford walks the leadoff batter on 4 pitches.  He then strikes out Abreu on the slider, then walks Dunn, putting the tying runs on base.  He then gives up a three-run homerun, turning the 3-1 lead into a 4-3 loss.  The decision to throw Abreu a fastball in the first cost the Indians the game, and the failure to let Kluber start the 9th also cost them the game.

The Sox play the Cubs the next 4 games, and rather than going into that series reeling after having lost 5 straight games, they go into the series on an emotional high after the ninth-inning comeback.

Rick Renteria, new Cub manager, has shown in his first game that he is like all other managers in not understanding key situations in games, and making the same mistakes the others do.  He very likely cost the Cubs their opening game today.  Managers have to manage based on that game’s and that moment’s situations, and his decision showed that he didn’t understand this.  The Cubs played the Pirates in Pittsburgh.  This was the situation:

1. The game was scoreless in the top of the 8th, and neither team was hitting.  This meant that one run at that point was huge.
2. The Cubs only had 5 hits, and 3 were by one player, so no one else was hitting.
3. The Cubs failed in men-in-scoring-position situations a number of times, and were not getting key hits.  Why did Renteria think they would all of a sudden start getting key hits?  They twice had first and second, no outs, and didn’t score, and had a man in scoring position with one out in the 9th and didn’t score again.

So, the Cubs had a man on second, no outs, in the 8th.  They bunted him to third, which meant they were playing for one run.  Based on the above and what should have been a strong feeling on Renteria’s part that the Cubs weren’t hitting in the clutch today, he should have squeezed to try to score.  He didn’t squeeze, the Cubs didn’t score, and lost 1-0 in 10 innings.  Squeezes aren’t automatic, but there was no question the Cubs had a far greater chance of scoring by attempting a squeeze than by not attempting it.  If Renteria had a feeling of how the game was going, he would have known this.

Mike Matheny, Cardinal manager, contributed to the Cardinals’ loss last night.  The Red Sox had a man on second, one out, in the top of the first inning, with David Ortiz up.  Ortiz has been incredibly hot, and with first base open, the smart move would have been to walk him.  Matheny pitched to him, and he doubled in the run.  The next two batters struck out, although I am not saying that would have still happened.  The point is that you can’t let Ortiz beat you in that situation, since he is so locked in.  Going into the game, he was 8 for 11 in the World Series, went 3 for 4 in this game, and tied a World Series record by reaching base 10 consecutive times.  How can you pitch to him in this situation?  This was a 1-1 game going into the 7th inning, so this run was huge.  The final was 3-1 Boston.

Mike Matheny, Cardinal manager, contributed to the Cardinals’ loss tonight.  The Cardinals trailed 4-2 with two outs in the bottom of the ninth.  They had a man on first, with Carlos Beltran up.  Beltran is a clutch power hitter, and at least gave the Cardinals a chance to tie the game.  Matheny put in Wong, a fast pinch runner, which made sense.  Wong was taking a very large lead off first base, and I said he could get picked off.  I said he had to take less of a lead, because his run wasn’t the tying run.  There was no reason for him to take the big lead, which I noticed and commented on, but apparently Matheny and his coaches didn’t understand.  The announcers mentioned a couple of times that they were surprised the Red Sox were even holding him on first base, as he wasn’t the tying run and a lefty was up.  Again, Matheny and his coaches didn’t get this, and they picked Wong off to end the game.

Mike Matheny, Cardinals manager, showed that he, like every other manager, doesn’t understand game situations.  He made a number of very questionable decisions in the critical Game 3 of a World Series that was tied 1-1.

1.  The Cardinals, up 2-0, had bases loaded, no outs, in the bottom of the 4th inning, with the eighth, ninth, and leadoff hitters due up.  Since the bottom of the order was up, the chances of scoring were much less.  In addition, if they don’t score, the momentum change significantly increases the chances of the Red Sox scoring.  Does Matheny squeeze, even with one out and the pitcher up?  No, and they don’t score.  As a result of the momentum change, the Red Sox scored the next inning, and tied it the inning after that.  In addition, the inning after the Cardinals failed to score saw the Cardinal pitcher struggle and throw a lot of pitches as a result of the momentum change.

2.  In the bottom of the 7th, the Cardinals were up 4-2, and had a man on third, with no outs.  The fifth run is huge in this situation, as the Red Sox only have two more at-bats, and a three-run lead is much different than a 2-run lead.  In addition, if they don’t score, the chances would increase that the Red Sox would score, although not as much as usual since the Cardinals had already scored that inning.  The Red Sox have a tough pitcher in the game.  Does Matheny squeeze?  No, they strand the runner, and the Red Sox score two runs the next inning to tie.  All of the Boston runs followed Cardinal failures to get runners in from third with less than two outs.

3.  In the bottom of the ninth in a 4-4 game, the Cardinals had second and third, one out.  They had already failed twice to score runners from third with less than two outs.  The Red Sox had their best reliever in the game, and he is probably the hottest reliever in baseball.  The Cardinals didn’t squeeze again, the batter hit a ground ball to second, and the runner was thrown out at the plate for the second out.  If not for the wild throw to third by the catcher that followed, allowing the winning run to score, there would have been a good chance that the Cardinals wouldn’t have scored that inning, and they would have gone into extra innings having already used their closer, with the momentum having shifted to Boston.

4.  Allen Craig, who isn’t playing due to an injured foot, was on second base after a pinch-hit double, resulting in the situation in Point 3 above.  If Matheny would have left him in the game had they not scored, I understand him leaving him on second when he could hardly run due to his injury, but if he would have taken him out of the game, Matheny should have put in a pitcher to pinch run.  Craig ended up being the winning run, and he could hardly run the bases.

The Tigers won the first game in the ALCS, and had a chance to go up 2-0 in games, winning two games in Boston.  The Tigers led Game 2 5-1 after 7, and Scherzer was in complete command.  He pitched 7 innings, gave up 2 hits, 1 run, and had 13 strikeouts.  The last inning he pitched, the 7th, was an easy 1-2-3 inning, where he struck out the first two, and the third batter grounded out.  He’d thrown 108 pitches, and he might have said he was tired.  When a pitcher is in complete command and a manager takes him out, this frequently gives the other team new life.  The Tigers bullpen has been their weakness.  My decision would have been to ask him to start the 8th inning, and see how he feels.  I’d tell him not to throw quite as hard, and if the leadoff batter gets on, I’d make the change.  If the third batter of the 7th inning would have reached, Scherzer would probably have faced another batter in that situation, so why not have him face another batter in the 8th?  Scherzer was taken out after 7, the Red Sox scored 4 in the 8th to tie, and scored in the 9th to win.  There is a big difference going to Detroit up 2-0, and tied 1-1 with a loss of momentum.

In the next game, Game 3, the Tigers hadn’t scored all game, and weren’t hitting.  Boston also wasn’t hitting, and only had 4 hits the entire game.  In this scenario, each run is extremely important.  The Tigers, who had already stranded a man on third with one out in the 5th, when they didn’t squeeze with the 8th and 9th hitters up (strikeout, groundout), had first and third, one out, in the bottom of the 8th, down 1-0, with Cabrera due up, and then Fielder.  I understand that everyone will say that Cabrera is the best hitter in baseball and probably doesn’t know how to bunt, but in this situation, where the team hasn’t been hitting or scoring (nor has the opponent), I stated that they were not going to score if they did not squeeze.  I said this in two previous situations with Cabrera last year, and was right both of those times.  Cabrera was not swinging well in this game, as he was 0-3 with a strikeout, and was 1-4 in the previous game.  Cabrera struck out, Fielder struck out, the Tigers didn’t score, and they lost 1-0 to go down 2-1 in the series.  I have always said that managers need to have all their players practice bunting, even power hitters, as you don’t know who will come up in a critical situation.

Tonight, the Cubs and Pirates were in a 1-1 game going into the 9th inning.  Sveum brought Kevin Gregg in to another non-save situation, and again, he gave up the winning run.  The Cubs lost 2-1 as a result.

During the two years Dale Sveum has managed the Cubs, when he brings the closer into a non-save situation, the closer gives up runs and loses the game.  Today, the Cubs and Braves were in a 5-5 tie, going into the 9th.  When Sveum brought Kevin Gregg, their closer, into the game, I said it was over.  4 runs later, the inning ended, and the Cubs lost 9-5.  I don’t know if there were other pitchers available (I would assume there were since it was only the 9th inning and rosters have been expanded), but even if there were no other pitchers available, this has happened numerous times.

Dale Sveum, Cub manager, continues to make decisions that are not successful.  He brings in his closer in non-save situations, which backfires, and he continues to let players who are hot beat him, rather than facing other batters.

Yesterday’s game was a perfect example.  The Cubs blew a 5-0 lead, and the game was tied 5-5 after 8 innings.  He brought Kevin Gregg, the closer, in for the 9th.  Gregg had failed in previous situations such as this, and when he brought him in, I said the game was over.  Gregg gave up a run, and the Cubs lost 6-5.

Prior to the Phillies scoring the winning run, they had a runner on second with two outs.  The batter was Michael Young, who was hot, as he was 3 for 4 with an RBI.  I said they should not let the hot bat beat them, and walk him.  Rollins was on deck, and was hitting below .250.  They pitched to Young, he singled in the winning run to go 4 for 5, and then they retired Rollins.

A week ago, the Cubs blew a 6-0 lead to the Padres, and lost.  When it was 6-3, the Padres had men on second and third, with Will Venable up.  I said they should walk him since he is their hottest hitter and first base was open.  I didn’t think they should let their hottest hitter beat them.  They pitched to Venable, and he tripled in both runs, making it a 6-5 game.  Venable later homered to break a 6-6 tie.

When will Sveum realize he has closers that are not effective in non-save situations?  The same thing happened when Marmol was their closer.  When will he realize that he shouldn’t let the other team’s hottest hitter beat him?

Yesterday’s first game of a White Sox-Phillies doubleheader proved once again that managers just don’t get it.  The Sox were handed a victory due to terrible strategy on the part of the Phillies, as well as by an error that allowed the eventual winning run to score in extra innings.

The score was tied at 3 when the game resumed in the bottom of the 9th after a rain delay.  The Phillies’ first two batters reached, and they had second and third, no outs.  This means they had two opportunities to squeeze in the winning run.  They didn’t squeeze and didn’t score.

In the tenth, still tied, the Phillies had first and third, one out.  They had just failed to score the previous inning on two chances with the winning run on third and less than two outs.  Did the Phillies attempt to squeeze in the winning run?  No, and again, they did not score.

As so often happens when a team doesn’t score with a man on third and less than two outs, the momentum change results in the other team scoring.  The Sox did score in the 11th to take a 4-3 lead, then scored a second run on a two-out error on a ground ball that should have ended the inning.  The Phillies did score a run in the bottom of the 11th, but the run that scored on the error was the difference.

The Sox won 5-4 due to the terrible Phillies strategy.

Tonight, the White Sox led  the Red Sox 2-0 after 7.  Boston had been no-hit for over 6 innings, so obviously wasn’t hitting or scoring (they ended up with 4 hits).  They didn’t score with a bases-loaded one-out situation in the 7th.  In the eighth, they had first-and-third, one out, down 2-1, with Ortiz up.  The one run Boston scored was the result of an error, not a hit.  Friends say you shouldn’t squeeze with Ortiz for the same reason you wouldn’t squeeze with Cabrera (Tigers–see previous posts) in similar situations, and that’s why those strategies and the White Sox’ opponents continue to lose.  Of course Ortiz hit into a double play, and they didn’t score.  The momentum of not scoring contributed to the White Sox scoring a big insurance run in the bottom of the 8th (that and the idiocy of giving Rios anything to hit).  So, once again, people can say how ridiculous it would be to squeeze with a power hitter in a situation where the team not only wasn’t hitting or scoring but the inning before didn’t score bases-loaded, one out, and once again, I’ll say that these managers can keep explaining losses with their traditional logic that doesn’t work.

Further to my post two posts below this one, here is another example.  In last night’s White Sox-Nationals game, the Nationals led 7-5 going into the top of the 8th.  Storen came in to pitch, and was dominant.  He had a 1-2-3 inning, only threw 10 pitches, and had 2 strikeouts.  The Nationals scored in the bottom of the 8th to make it 8-5.  Does the Nationals’ manager leave Storen in since he’s obviously on?  Does he let him start the 9th?  No, he brings in Soriano, their closer, assuming he’ll be on when he knows Storen is.  Soriano gives up a 2-run homerun to make the score 8-7, then goes 3-0 to Konerko, a power hitter representing the tying run who hit a 3-run homerun earlier in the game.  He got Konerko, but this game should not have been this close.

Dale Sveum continues to jeopardize and cost the Cubs wins by his decisions.  Tonight, the Cubs led Atlanta 5-1 in the 7th.   The Cubs had first and third with one out.  At this point in the game, every run is critical, so they should have squeezed.  They didn’t squeeze and didn’t score.  Even though the momentum changed, the Cubs were able to prevent Atlanta from scoring in the 7th.  In the 8th, the Cubs had bases loaded, no outs.  Again, every run is critical at this point, and if you can’t get the run in with no outs, you have to squeeze with one out.  The Cubs didn’t squeeze and didn’t score.  This was a big momentum change, and Atlanta scored 3 in the 8th to make it 5-4.  They had first and second (the tying run) with one out, but the Cubs got a double play.  The Cubs left 2 more on in the 9th.  Sveum brings Marmol in to close in the 9th.  Marmol struggled at the end of spring training and in every appearance this year.  He has control issues and has been getting hit hard.  This is a one-run game and you can’t afford to blow a game you led by 4 runs in the 8th, but he brings Marmol in anyway.  Marmol comes in, gives up a leadoff homerun to tie the game, gets an out, then gives up a homerun to lose the game.

Baseball managers continue to bring their closers into games, even if the pitcher who pitched the 8th inning was dominant.  This belief that every pitcher will be on every day costs games.  Here are two recent examples:

Cubs’ Game 3 against the Pirates:  The Cubs, up 1-0, had Fujikawa pitch the 8th.  He was dominant, and only needed 9 pitches in a 1-2-3 inning.  The Pirates only had 1 hit through 8, but instead of leaving Fujikawa in to pitch or at least start the 9th, Sveum brings in Marmol.  Marmol struggled at the end of spring training and in his appearances this year.  Despite the Pirates only having one hit to this point, Marmol gave up 3 hits and a walk.  This made a 3-0 game a 3-2 game, and the Pirates had first and third (the tying run) with no outs.  He was able to strike out the next batter and get a double play (the Pirates didn’t squeeze), so the Cubs were fortunate to win a game they led by 3 in the 9th, but Sveum’s decision almost cost them the game.

Sox’ Game 4 against Seattle:  In a 6-6 game, Loe came in and pitched a 1-2-3 9th for Seattle, and only needed 7 pitches.  Seattle scored 2 in the top of the 10th, and rather than leaving Loe in, they brought in their closer.  Two walks and a hit made it 8-7, and a walk loaded the bases with two outs.  The first out was a deep fly by Dunn that might have been a homerun if the wind wasn’t blowing in.  The Sox now had the winning run in scoring position, but the pitcher got a strikeout.  Another example of a game almost being blown (others are blown) by taking out a pitcher who is pitching well to bring in the closer.

Well, the Sox are 2-0, and both wins were helped greatly by terrible managing by the opposing manager.  Game 1 was covered in the previous post, so let’s look at Game 2.

In the top of the 7th, with the Sox leading 4-2, the Royals had the bases loaded, with one out.  They had a lefty hitter, Gordon, at bat, and the Sox had Donnie Veal pitching.  Veal is a lefty that completely dominated lefty hitters last year.  The chances of the Royals scoring without squeezing were almost nonexistent, and not squeezing cost the Royals a potential win the game before.  The Royals didn’t squeeze and didn’t score.  As so often happens, leaving a runner on third with less than 2 outs and not scoring changes the momentum, and the other team scores the next inning.  This is what happened–the Sox’ leadoff hitter homered, making the score 5-2, basically ending the game.

Both White Sox wins in a 2-0 start to the season were greatly impacted by terrible managing by the opponent, but no one realizes this.  That’s why these bad strategies continue to be used.

Now, to the Cubs.  The Cubs, down 2-0 to Pittsburgh in the 7th, had bases loaded, one out, and Lillibridge up.  The Cubs weren’t hitting and ended up with 2 hits for the game, the temperature was in the 30s so it was very cold making it difficult to hit and score, and Lillibridge was up, and he hadn’t had a hit yet this year.  The Cubs didn’t squeeze, Lillibridge struck out and they didn’t score, and the resulting change of momentum had the Pirates score the next inning making it 3-0, basically ending the game.

Manny Acta, Cleveland manager, gave the White Sox a critical game tonight, tremendously helping their attempt to make the playoffs.  Detroit won their game earlier, so if the White Sox lost, they would be tied for first.  In addition, the Sox would have lost their sixth straight game and would have been reeling, with a lot of pressure on them.  Detroit would have had some momentum, and the Sox would have been struggling greatly.  Now, as a result of Acta’s complete mismanaging, the White Sox have the momentum of a comeback win and a one-game lead.

The Indians led 3-2 in the bottom of the 7th inning, and Joe Smith, the Indians’ pitcher, struck out the first two White Sox.  I made the statement at that point that if he retired the third batter, he was obviously on tonight and had to pitch the 8th inning.  I said Acta could not bring in another pitcher and hope that pitcher was also on.  Smith struck out the third batter, so he struck out the side and was in complete command.  I said again that Smith had to pitch the 8th.  What does Acta do?  He takes out Smith, and brings in Pestano.  Pestano gave up 3 runs in the 8th, and the White Sox won 5-4.

The Sox continue to benefit from Leyland costing the Tigers games and now Acta giving the Sox a game.  When will managers ever get this?  I will admit the Sox got robbed of a run on a bad call on a play at the plate.

Jim Leyland cost the Tigers a chance to win tonight’s game against the Twins, where a win would have tied them with the White Sox for first place.  In a 1-1 game after 9 innings, I stated that he can’t bring Valverde into the game because he would give up the winning run.  Valverde hasn’t pitched well lately, and this isn’t a save situation.  Leyland brings in Valverde, and he gives up the winning run.  The White Sox continue to benefit greatly from Leyland’s mistakes.

The Cubs were playing the Reds tonight, and the score was 5-5 in the bottom of the 10th.  The Cubs had runners on second and third, with one out.  I knew if they didn’t squeeze, they wouldn’t score.  The on-deck hitter was a .170 hitter.  Does Sveum squeeze?  No, and they don’t score.  As I continue to say, if you don’t score a man from third with less than two outs while not scoring at all that inning, the momentum change significantly increases the chances of the other team scoring during their next at-bat.  The Cubs didn’t score, the Reds did score in the top of the 11th, and won 6-5.  I continue to point out examples of this, but managers continue to not understand this.

The Tigers and White Sox played a critical makeup game today.  For days, I said the Tigers needed to start Max Scherzer, as he has been great.  His last start was 5 days ago against the White Sox, and he gave up 1 run, 4 hits, 0 walks, and 7 strikeouts in 6 innings.  He would have been pitching on his normal 4 days rest.

This is a critical game, because if the Tigers lost, they would be 3 games behind with only 16 to play.  In addition, the game is worth 2 games in the standings, because the Tigers would either be 1 game out or 3 games out, depending upon the outcome.  With the game having such importance and there being so few games left, you need to do what you have to do to win.  This meant that Leyland should have changed the rotation to pitch Scherzer on his regular rest and give an extra day’s rest to Fister.  Instead, Leyland pitched Fister, and the Tigers lost.

Scherzer has been great.  In his last seven starts, he has been 6-0 and has given up these earned runs:  2, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1.  This is the biggest game of the year to this point, and Leyland had a very hot pitcher that had shut the Sox down 5 days ago, but chose to go in another direction and it cost them.

Jim Leyland showed once again that managers just don’t get it.  The Tigers played a key game against Cleveland today, as they are 1 game behind the White Sox with the makeup game with the Sox tomorrow.  A win today would have kept them a game behind going into the Sox game, with a chance to tie for first.

The Tigers led 6-5 going into the 9th inning, and had runners on first and third, with one out in the ninth.  Since the Tigers had Cabrera and Fielder due up, Leyland let Cabrera hit and didn’t squeeze.  He failed to realize that in this situation, you have to score one run and not play for a big inning, for two reasons.  One, there is a big difference going into the bottom of the ninth up 2 runs vs. being up one run.  The other reason is that if you don’t score, the other team’s chance of scoring goes up significantly due to the momentum change of not letting a runner on third with less than two outs score.  Leyland doesn’t squeeze, Cabrera strikes out, the Tigers don’t score, and the Indians score twice in the bottom of the ninth to win the game and give the Tigers a heartbreaking loss going into the critical Sox game.  The Sox come into the game with momentum, having swept the Twins, and the Tigers could have come in with the same momentum, having swept Cleveland (instead of coming in off a heartbreaking loss), had Leyland understood the situation.

First, a little history.  Mark Buehrle threw a perfect game against the Tampa Bay Rays a few years ago.  I watched the game, and it was obvious all game that Buehrle was only going to throw offspeed pitches.  As I watched, I was extremely frustrated that the Ray hitters kept looking fastball, when Buehrle wasn’t throwing any.  I said this all game, and later found out the Tampa Bay announcers were also upset and saying this all game.  After the game, Buehrle said he threw less than 5 fastballs.  Buehrle pitched well, but the batters kept getting themselves out.  I made the statement after the game that a large part of the perfect game was due to the terrible strategy and failure to adjust by the Ray hitters, and this was debated by Sox fans.  I also said that no-hitters and perfect games were much more common, and although a great achievement, it’s obviously not as hard as it was in the past to throw one.  Again, Sox fans argued with me.  Sox fans also said Tampa Bay had a great-hitting team, so Buehrle’s game was a dominant performance.  I responded by saying that “great-hitting team” got itself out over and over.

Now, to today.  Felix Hernandez threw a perfect game against the Rays.  If I count the perfect game a few years ago that the umpire blew on the final play (it truly was a perfect game), that means there have been 24 perfect games in history.  7 have been in the last 4 years, and 3 have been against the Rays.  So, almost 30% of the perfect games have been thrown in the last 4 years, making this somewhat easier than in the past.  The Rays have been the victims of a perfect game 3 times since 2009 and have been no-hit once since 2009, meaning they have been no-hit 4 times since 2009.  No other team has been no-hit in that time more than once.  This means the Rays have a greater chance of being no-hit than other teams.  Tonight, Hernandez struck out 12 batters, ALL on offspeed pitches!  So, it’s obvious nothing has changed, and again, the Ray batters didn’t adjust.

The Sox fans were obviously wrong.

The White Sox won last night and tonight on gifts by the Toronto Blue Jays.  These were key games because Detroit is two games behind, and won yesterday and today.  Yesterday, the Sox won 3-2, and their third and winning run scored on a wild throw by the pitcher on a pickoff.

Tonight, the Blue Jays hit a three-run homer in the bottom of the sixth to tie the game at 4 and get some momentum.  In the top of the seventh, the Sox had a lefty batter facing a lefty pitcher.  The pitcher walked him, then hit the next batter.  Both gifts.  That brought up Dunn, who is a lefty.  The manager took out his lefty pitcher, and brought in a righty to face Dunn!  The pitcher immediately went 2-0 on him, putting himself in a hole.  My son was in the room but not watching, and when he heard the count, he laughed, said “here comes a fastball,” and came over to watch the pitch, as we both knew it would be a homerun.  After he said “here comes a fastball,” I said, I know he’ll throw a fastball which is stupid, but at least make it high.  The pitcher threw a low fastball, and Dunn hit a three-run homer, making the score 7-4 and changing the game.  Later in the inning, the pitcher went 3-1 on Viciedo, again putting himself in a hole, and threw a fastball down the middle that Viciedo hit for a 2-run homerun.  I guess managers will never learn.  A 4-4 game with momentum became a 9-4 game due to terrible strategy.  These 5 gift runs gave the Sox a 9-5 win, and kept them 2 games up on Detroit.

The White Sox continue to hold a one-game lead over the Detroit Tigers, thanks to Jim Leyland mismanaging two recent games.

1.  A few days ago, the Tigers were trailing the Yankees 4-3 in the bottom of the ninth.  The Tigers had first and third, no outs.  The first batter should try to get a hit, as you want to try to score two runs and win the game.  Should this batter fail, you need to squeeze to make sure you tie the game, so you can go from there.  The Tigers’ first batter did not get the run in, the Tigers failed to squeeze with the second batter, didn’t score as a result, and lost the game.

2.  Tonight, the Tigers were tied with the Texas Rangers 1-1 in the top of the ninth.  The Tigers had bases loaded, one out.  The Tigers had only one run all game, hadn’t scored since the first inning, and two of the three runners on base reached on walks.  What made Leyland think they could automatically start hitting and scoring, since they hadn’t been able to do this all game?  He didn’t squeeze, and the Tigers didn’t score.  Stranding a man on third with less than two outs and not scoring in that inning significantly increases the chances the other team will score in their next at-bat, as the momentum has changed.  Texas did score in the bottom of the ninth, and won 2-1.

Tonight’s game was an important game for the White Sox, as both Detroit and Cleveland lost.  The Sox were up 3-2, and Kevin Youkilis was at bat with runners on second and third, two out.  He was 3 for 4 yesterday in his return to Fenway, including two doubles, and is hitting .323 since joining the Sox, with 15 RBI in 17 games.  He’s had a lot of clutch hits, and a lot of game-winning hits.  Lester is a lefty, and lefty-hitting Adam Dunn was on deck.  A Little League manager would know to walk Youkilis in that situation, and the Sox radio announcers basically said they should walk him.  What does Boston do? They pitch to Youkilis, he hits a three-run homerun to put the White Sox up 6-2, and they win 7-5.  Oh, in case you were wondering, Dunn struck out as the next batter.

This is a response to a friend who commented on the previous post:

I gave you the statistics.  When I say a team should squeeze or they won’t score, they NEVER score if they don’t squeeze.  Therefore, if the squeeze only worked ONCE for all the times I’ve said the teams should squeeze, my teams would be ahead.  Why does everyone think there is a risk to squeezing, but no one thinks there is a risk to not squeezing?

Tonight’s game was the first game after the All-Star break.  Detroit has been hot and Cleveland has been hanging in.  It would be important to Detroit and Cleveland to get off to a good second-half start, and would be damaging to the Sox to come out struggling.  Detroit and Cleveland already won tonight, so this was an important game.

The Royals had bases-loaded, one out, in the bottom of the 11th.  I said at the time you have to squeeze, because you probably won’t score if you don’t, and if you don’t, the Sox are almost guaranteed to score due to the momentum change.  The Royals don’t squeeze, don’t score, and the Sox score in the top of the 12th to take an 8-7 lead.  The Royals did tie it in the 12th, but the Sox won in 14.

So, once again, the failure to squeeze cost a team a game, and gave the Sox an important game.  Steve Stone, Sox announcer, called it “a huge win.”

Yesterday, I saw the 8th inning of the Sox-Tigers game, with the Tigers up 2-1. I saw Benoit have an easy 1-2-3 8th, striking out 2 of the hitters. I said at the time that he was on that day and needed to pitch the ninth, since it was a relatively important game since the Sox are probably the team that will finish second, and that I had a feeling Valverde would blow it. So, once again, I was right and the manager was wrong. Valverde gave up 2 in the ninth, and the Tigers lost. Today, the Tigers had first and third in the bottom of the 7th, one out, leading 2-1. The Sox hadn’t been scoring runs in a while, and their only run today was in the first inning. Getting this third run in was critical, as one extra run would be huge. There was a lefty batter facing a Sox lefty pitcher. I knew that if they didn’t squeeze they wouldn’t score, and of course they didn’t squeeze and didn’t score. Benoit came in an pitched another 1-2-3 8th, so of course they brought Valverde in for the 9th and he almost blew the game.

Game 1, and already Sveum has proven he doesn’t have a clue.  Here are three late-game moves that were idiotic, each of which cost the Cubs the game:

1. Top of the eighth, 1-0 Cubs. Dempster is pitching a one-hitter with 10 strikeouts. He gets the first guy out, and the second guy gets a seeing-eye single that wasn’t hard hit. He gets the next guy out for the second out. Instead of leaving Dempster in, since he is in complete command and struck out the on-deck (not next) hitter three times, he takes him out and brings in Wood. Wood only pitched a few innings this spring and Sveum is assuming he’ll be on like Dempster was, which I’ve always said is a dangerous assumption.  Even if Dempster was on a pitch count, you’ve got to leave him in for that batter.  In addition, taking out a pitcher who has dominated you gives the other team new life. Even though the Cubs should have been out of the inning due to a bad non-strike-three call which the replay showed, Wood walked the first three guys he faced, even after going 0-2, I  believe, on the third guy, forcing in the tying run.

2. Sveum brings in Marmol in the ninth, which is a non-save situation, which means he’ll give up a run, which he did even after getting the first two outs.

3. The Cubs get a triple with one out in the bottom of the ninth, putting the tying run on third. Sveum doesn’t squeeze, and the Cubs don’t score.  Sveum was assuming Jeff Baker would get a hit or hit a fly ball into the wind.

I was told Soriano was out trying to steal third in the fourth inning.  I feel trying to steal third is the most stupid play in sports unless you’re Rickey Henderson in your prime, so if Soriano did this, he should be benched for a week. However, I blame Sveum for this too, as he should have made it clear to his players if you try to steal third, safe or out, you’re benched for a week. The risks are so much greater than the reward. I also tell them you only try to take third on a wild pitch/passed ball if you can go in standing up. I also tell them if they slide into first, unless to avoid a tag, they’re benched for a week.

I’ll give you another example of idiotic strategy that I keep seeing without managers learning. I see Sale come in at the end of games, as he did tonight, and opposing managers keep putting lefties up to bat. I’d rather have my worst righty hitter coming off the bench to pinch hit in the 9th than a lefty hitter in my starting lineup. These lefties continue to wave at his pitches and strike out, and the managers keep putting lefties up there.

Tonight was a perfect example of what I keep saying.  The Rays were playing a critical game against the Yankees, and would either be 1-1/2 or 2-1/2 games out of the wild card depending upon whether they won or lost.  They were tied 2-2 in the top of the 8th. The Rays had bases loaded, one out.  The Yankees only had 2 hits to this point, so they weren’t hitting or scoring, meaning one run is very big.  The Rays had to score, because if they didn’t, they not only would blow a great opportunity, but if they left a man on third with less than 2 outs, the chances of the Yankees scoring would rise dramatically due to the momentum change.  Did the Rays squeeze?  No.  The batter hit into a double play, and of course the Yankees then scored 2 in the bottom of the 8th to win 4-2.  The Rays might have cost themselves a playoff spot by this idiotic strategy.

I’ve said that I think most managers/coaches don’t have a clue in many situations, such as when you should squeeze because you won’t score if you don’t, throwing on first down, etc.  Let’s look at last night.  Ozzie brought in Sale for the 9th in a 1-run game, because he knew the Royals had two lefties coming up and he felt this would give him an advantage.  Managers make moves because they think these moves will help them win.  If you’re the opposing manager, your job is also to make moves to give your team the best chance to win.  If you see that Ozzie feels bringing in a lefty will help the Sox, you need to think if you agree.  If you do agree, you need to counter those moves to give your team a better chance.  In this case, the manager did nothing, and it was a 1-2-3 inning as to be expected.  Did the manager think he had a better chance with those lefty batters?  It’s a possibility, but if so, I think he was stupid, and I turned out to be right.  If he didn’t think he had a better chance with those batters, why didn’t he make a move?  Unless the manager was out of options and had no righty hitters on the bench, why wouldn’t he pinch hit righties?  Has he scouted Sale recently to see how tough he’s been, especially against lefties?  If the opponent makes a move to give themselves an advantage, you need to make a move to counter it.  That’s basic.

Here are today’s gifts:

Every time I watch a Sox game, I see gift after gift to give them wins or keep them in games.  And, keep in mind, I only see parts of games!  These are all unforced errors.  Today is just another of the many examples.

This year’s All-Star game is another perfect example of how managers and coaches don’t understand strategy and don’t understand their players.  A few years ago, the N.L. blew another All-Star game when the N.L. manager brought in Trevor Hoffman to give up 2 runs and the one-run lead in the 9th, despite the fact everyone else knew it was the wrong move.  That manager also failed to put in better defensive players who were available in an effort to hold the 9th-inning lead, and that also cost the N.L.

During this year’s game, which the National League was leading, I made the statement that Hurdle should only pitch Billy Wagner and Brad Lidge as a last resort, as I don’t believe either perform well on the “big stage.”  So, what does Hurdle do?

The N.L. led 3-2 in the bottom of the 8th, and Brian Wilson retires the first two american league hitters, including one by strikeout.  Hurdle then takes out a pitcher who is doing well, and brings in Wagner, who promptly gives up 2 hits and the tying run.  Despite the fact that Wagner actually struck out Longoria (but the ump failed to call the strike) to end the inning prior to the run-scoring double to tie the game, Wagner should never have been brought into the game.

Hurdle announced prior to the game that he was saving Lidge to be the closer, which I knew was a huge mistake for the reason above.  Lidge did have to pitch the 15th as the N.L. was out of pitchers, and promptly gave up the winning run.

In the 10th inning, facing Mariano Rivera, the best closer in the a.l., the N.L. had first and third, one out.  Hurdle didn’t squeeze, and the N.L. didn’t score.

In the 12th, the N.L. had bases loaded, one out, and Dan Uggla up.  Prior to this at-bat, he had 2 errors, a strikeout and had hit into a double play.  Uggla would go on to have 3 strikeouts and a double play in 4 at-bats, and commit 3 errors.  This was obviously not his night, so you need to squeeze in this situation.  Hurdle didn’t squeeze, he struck out, and the N.L. didn’t score.

I realize the a.l. could have squeezed twice also and won the game, but didn’t squeeze and didn’t score.  I continue to push the value of squeezes, but especially in an All-Star game when you are facing the best pitchers, it makes even more sense.  I didn’t hear one announcer mention this or see anything written about the failure to squeeze and thus score in these situations.  Even when the winning run scored in the 15th, a halfway decent throw would have gotten the runner and ended the inning, and the failure to squeeze would have again cost a team the winning run.

As per usual, the 2-run homerun for the a.l. to tie the game at 2 was hit by J.D. Drew, a National Leaguer, off Edinson Volquez, an american leaguer.

The only bright spot to the National League loss, which was caused entirely by Clint Hurdle, is the fact that now the Cubs will win the World Series at home, as Game 4 will be in the National League park.

The Cubs won the first three games at Wrigley Field this year despite having key players out with injuries, then lost the next three games at U.S. Cellular.  Let’s look at what happened during those last three games:

1. The Cubs were playing without Alfonso Soriano, Reed Johnson, Scott Eyre, and Carlos Zambrano (who was supposed to pitch the third game).  Ryan Theriot missed the first 2 games due to injury.  Jim Edmonds and Kosuke Fukudome played injured, and Darryl Ward just returned from a lengthy absence due to injury.  The Cubs were forced to play guys out of position, resulting in errors, and their hitting was greatly affected by the injuries.  In addition to the injuries, Aramis Ramirez was 0-13 in the series, and was distracted by the fact that he needed to return to the Dominican Repuplic for family reasons.  He asked to have Sunday off, which was Game 3 of the second series, but the Cubs refused.  He did miss the next 3 games.
2. Game 1:  In the first game, the Sox led 4-0, and Dye was thrown out at third on a steal.  He was called safe, and by the White Sox radio postgame analyst’s own admission, this bad call allowed the Sox to get 4 more runs that inning, making the lead 8-0 and making any Cub comeback very difficult.
3. Game 2:  The Cubs led 2-0, and with 2 outs, pitched to Dye instead of walking him to get to Thome.  Dye was on fire, and Thome hadn’t had a hit in a long time.  Dye hit a 2-run homer to tie it.  Later in the inning, the Cubs threw Crede a breaking ball, and he hit if off the wall to give the Sox a 3-2 lead.  I’ve said for 3-1/2 years that Crede sits on breaking balls, and you can’t throw him one in a key situation.
4. Game 2:  With the game tied 5-5 in the 7th, the Cub batter hit a double that any player in the league would have easily scored from first on, but Edmonds, running on a very bad leg and due to all the other outfield injuries forcing him to stay in the game, only reached third.  He didn’t score, and this run would have made it 6-5 Cubs, and their late-inning relievers would have had the opportunity to take over.  Again, injuries played a significant factor.
5. Game 2:  Marmol, who should not have been brought in in the 7th, gave up the game-winning homerun.  That’s not his situation.
6. Game 2:  With a man on third and less than 2 outs in the 9th, down 6-5, the Cubs did not squeeze and did not score.  The Sox had used almost all of their relievers, so if the Cubs tied it with a squeeze, they would have been in good shape.
7. Game 3:  Early in the game, the Sox had second and third, no outs, when Crede clearly struck out.  The umpire said he checked his swing, resulting in Piniella being ejected.  The call was horrible.
8. Game 3:  With the Sox up 1-0 in the top of the 5th, the Cubs had a man on first with no outs.  Cedeno grounded into a force at second, and clearly beat the throw to first.  The umpire called him out for a double play, the Sox fans went crazy as they knew he was safe, the interim Cub manager came out to argue, and the fans continued to cheer.  The Cubs should have had a man on first, one out, with the top of the order up.  This was a momentum changer, the crowd was into it, and next inning, Brian Anderson hit a 2-run homer to make it 3-0.
9. Game 3:  With 2 outs in the Sox 8th, Thome was up with a man on and a 3-1 Sox lead.  I immediately said the Cubs needed to bring in Cotts, a left-hander who had warmed up and was ready, as the Cubs couldn’t afford to go down by more runs going into the 9th.  The Cubs let Ascanio, a righty, pitch to Thome, and he hit a 2-run homer to make it 5-1.  The Cubs got the first two batters on base in the 9th, but being down 4 runs instead of 2 was a huge difference.
10. The Cubs’ baserunning was pathetic all series, helping the Sox in both series.  At Wrigley, Cedeno slid into first and was out by a hair and Marquis turned toward second on a hit and was tagged out.  At U.S. Cellular, in Game 3, the Cubs were doubled off second twice.  Yes, this is the Cubs’ fault, but these were gift outs for the Sox.
11. Piniella, after the second series, said, “I would have liked to have played them at full strength.”

One point about Mark Buehrle.  I went to Game 3 and watched him quick pitch guys and not give them a chance to get set in the batter’s box.  If I was the opposing manager, I would tell my players to go to the on-deck circle after every pitch and put pine tar on the bat.  I’d delay each pitch as much as I could.  Then, when the umps tried to stop it, I would say that when Buehrle allows the batter to get set before the pitch, I would then stop the delays before every pitch.  It was ridiculous.  When no one is on base, batters don’t have time to take practice half-swings that they normally take before each pitch.

Here’s another example of why managers will never get it. Tonight’s Cub game:

Cubs score in the 9th to take a 5-4 lead over the Dodgers. They then have first and third, one out, with Soto up. Aside from the fact that Soto already struck out twice, you have to get the run in and not play for a big inning. Two reasons, which I’ve always said. One, a 2-run lead is much different than an 1-run lead going into the bottom of the ninth. Two, if you don’t score the runner from third with less than two outs, the other team has a good chance of scoring due to the momentum change. Lou doesn’t squeeze, Cubs don’t score.

In the bottom of the 9th, Wood gives up a leadoff double due to the momentum change. From that point on, every fastball he threw, and he was throwing 96-98, was blown by the hitters. They had no chance. For some reason, he kept throwing sliders, and ended up loading the bases by hitting and walking guys. I was screaming fastball from the second batter of the inning, but Lou never figured this out. A batter or two later, Brenly (the TV announcer) kept saying throw fastballs. Finally, bases loaded, 2-0 on the batter, they decide to throw fastballs and Wood blows the guy away.

Please explain to me what game Piniella was watching.

As stated in a previous post, I believe it is more important to have Carlos Marmol available to come into games in situations when the game is on the line and there is no room for error. If you don’t get out of these situations, you don’t get to the situation where you can bring your closer in. The closer has room for error, and can give up a leadoff hit without it beating him. I believe Kerry Wood is fine in this role.

I would like to suggest a somewhat different scenario. Assuming you can warm up Wood and Marmol accordingly, I would have Marmol ready for the game-on-the-line situations, and then use Wood as the closer. However, if the Cubs had the lead going into the opponent’s 8th inning and didn’t need to use Marmol in a game-on-the-line situation, I would bring in Wood. If Wood shuts them out in the 8th, Marmol can close. If Wood gets in trouble in the 8th, Marmol can come in and get out of trouble, and then pitch the 9th.

The baseball season is well under way, and it’s good to see that managers still haven’t learned and don’t adequately scout opponents.  Here are examples from Cub and White Sox games from the last few days.

The Sox were batting in the bottom of the 9th in a tie game against the Yankees, and A.J. Pierzynski led off.  During the 2005 season, I pointed out that every homerun I’ve seen Pierzynski hit is off a low pitch.  Joba Chamberlain throws him a low pitch, and he flies out to the wall.  I realized the Yankees must not watch game tapes, and this was proven a few batters later.  The Sox had the winning run on second, and Joe Crede up.  I pointed out during the 2005 season that Crede goes up to bat looking for breaking balls, and all the homeruns and key hits I’ve seen him get are on breaking balls.  Chamberlain throws him two fastballs, and it’s 0-2.  He then throws him a breaking ball, and Crede lines the game-winning hit.  A few days later, Crede came to bat in the bottom of the 9th against Baltimore with the bases loaded, down 5-1, so he was the tying run.  The pitcher threw him nothing but fastballs, and of course he swung late and hit a routine fly to short right to end the game.  Obviously Baltimore watches films, and the Yankees do not.

I’ve pointed out many times that, in my opinion, attempting to steal third base is the most stupid play in sports.  The risk-reward ratio is ridiculous.  Being on third instead of second has far less benefit than the risk of being thrown out and taking your team out of an inning, as well as switching the momentum to the other team.  A few nights ago, my son and I were talking about how Theriot continues to try to steal third at Piniella’s urging, and that this would cost the Cubs a game very soon.  THE NEXT NIGHT, Theriot tried to steal third, was out, and this cost the Cubs the game.  In addition to the stupidity of this, the Cubs had Lee, Ramirez, and Fukudome due up, three MVP candidates.  In this same game, with the score tied at 3 in the 8th, the Cubs had first and third, one out, didn’t squeeze and didn’t score.  The Nationals hadn’t scored an earned run since the first inning, so this run would probably have won the game for the Cubs.

Teams will never learn.

Most of the broadcasters and journalists are saying that Carlos Marmol should be the Cubs’ closer next year, because he was almost unhittable this year. I disagree.

A closer tends to come in in the 9th inning to save the game. He just has to get through one inning, and you have some room for error. Marmol’s previous role was to come in prior to the 9th inning when there were runners on base and the game was on the line. There is no room for error in these situations, as if you give up a hit, the game is tied or the lead is lost. You have to be almost perfect in these game-on-the-line situations. Coming in in the 9th inning, you do have room for error, as you can give up one or even two hits (or walks) and still get out of the inning.

It is my opinion that it is more important to have Marmol pitch when the game is on the line and you have to stop the other team from scoring. If a pitcher fails in that situation, the game might not get to your closer.

Manager Lou Piniella’s strategies cost the Cubs a chance to win the NLDS series with the Arizona Diamondbacks.  His two major mistakes will be detailed below, but I will first address the comments that have been made regarding the Cubs.

1.  People say the Cubs were lucky to make the playoffs, as they are not a very good team and are in an easy division.  While I agree the Cubs did not play to their potential this year, the facts are these.  The Cubs had a horrible first two months, as Piniella was learning his personnel, Howry and Eyre couldn’t get anyone out, Zambrano was pitching badly, and they lost a large percentage of games by one run, giving many of them away.  Here is why the Cubs did deserve to be in the  playoffs:

• The last 4 months of the season, they had the best record in the National League.
• The Cub pitching staff was second in the National League, and everyone says pitching is the most important aspect of the game.
• The Cubs won 85 games, just 5 less than the Diamondbacks, who led the N.L. in wins with 90.  If not for the disastrous first two months, the Cubs would easily have won at least 95 games.

2.  Everyone says good pitching stops hitting, and that the Cubs ran into good pitching, which is why they lost.  While I agree with the statement, I don’t agree the Cubs ran into great pitching in this series.  The reasons for the Cubs not hitting will be detailed below, but I heard even Brandon Webb and  Doug Davis, the Arizona starters in the first two games, admitted they did not have great stuff.

Now, to the reasons Lou Piniella took away the Cubs’ chance to win the series:

1.  In Game 1, he took Carlos Zambrano, the Cubs’ ace, out after 6 innings in a 1-1 tie.  Zambrano was in complete command and had thrown only 85 pitches.  Piniella was trying to win Game 4 before Game 1 was won, and this has backfired many times in the past.  Every game in a playoff series is crucial, even moreso in a 5-game series.  You need to win Game 1 if at all possible, and by taking out Zambrano, Piniella significantly reduced the Cubs’ chances.  The Diamondback players said after the game it gave them new life to have Zambrano out of the game.  In 1998, Bruce Bochy of the San Diego Padres had his ace, Kevin Brown, going in Game 1 of the World Series and had the lead.  He took Brown out in the 7th inning, the Yankees scored 7 runs in that inning to win 9-6, Game 1 was lost, and it affected the momentum of the series.  This game was played at Yankee Stadium, so a first-game victory on the road would have been huge.  Piniella knew Zambrano was on and in command, so you have to go with a sure thing as opposed to hoping your reliever is also on.

2.   I said in the SECOND INNING of GAME 1 that the Cub batters were going into every at-bat looking fastball, and Webb was throwing breaking balls.  This continued throughout Games 1 and 2.  (I missed Game 3, but heard the Cubs had key strikeouts flailing at breaking balls in Game 3, also.)  It is a manager’s job to set the strategy, and the failure to have the Cub hitters go up looking breaking ball when that’s what they continued to get was the reason the Cubs only scored 6 runs in the series.  It wasn’t great pitching that stopped the Cubs, it was a ridiculous offensive gameplan.  I understand the batters should be smart enough to realize this since it was obvious from the beginning of Game 1, but it is still the manager’s responsibility to ensure the players play the way he wants them to.  The Cubs were flailing at breaking balls all series.  It is amazing they had as many runners in scoring position as they did with this philosophy, and easily would have scored a lot more runs with more intelligent at-bats.  The Cubs’ 0.194 batting average for the series was a direct result of batters looking for a fastball when the pitchers were constantly throwing breaking balls.